

26 January 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DCI

Attached is a critique of the OMB Staff Report on missile and space systems intelligence activities by an ad hoc group convened by Bronson Tweedy at your request. The people who participated with me in this review are:

D. Brandwein




S. Stevens

The critique includes recommendations for action. The paper work needed to implement any of these recommendations can be readily drafted for those which you approve.

Our group did not formally address a proposal in the OMB Report that a position of "ombudsman" be established in the Office of the DCI who would "be responsible for monitoring the status and evaluating the responsiveness of the data distribution mechanisms to the reasonable needs of the analysts". ~~My personal opinion on this proposal is that such a position would perform a valuable function and would be immediately useful for monitoring the contractor study recommended in Section A of our critique.~~

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Donald H. Steininger  
Chairman



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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: OMB Staff Report, "An Evaluation of the Collection Analysis and Distribution of Intelligence Data on Soviet ICBMs, SLBMs, ABM System and Space Programs", October 1972.

As requested, an ad hoc group was convened to review the OMB report; this is its critique and recommendations.

The report is comprehensive and detailed, and sets forth its conclusions and recommendations in the context of the President's memorandum to you of 5 November 1971. It specifically suggests a number of actions to be taken by you to improve the management focus in the community on various collection, analytic and distribution problems which the OMB staff thinks need attention.

The report deals almost entirely to that part of the intelligence effort relating to the technical aspects of Soviet missile systems, not with the production, deployment or force levels of those systems, and we have restricted our comments and recommendations to that subject matter.

In constructing our recommendations, we have made the assumption that the present USIB Committee structure for requirements and tasking would continue. We therefore did not take account of other, possibly more effective, organizational arrangements to do collection tasking.

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In particular, the possibility of a National Intelligence Operations Center with a collection guidance function is not addressed in this critique.

Finally, we have not speculated on changes that might occur in the basic management structure of the intelligence community and have assumed an organization roughly along present lines. However, the thrust of our recommendations for bringing all "national" intelligence collection systems under community management and funding will remain whatever the organizational structure.

For convenience we categorize the subject matter under four headings - Management, Program Planning and Assessment, Analysis, Processing and Data Distribution - and within those topics deal with each of the report's major conclusions.

#### Management

1. The report concludes that there is no effective management focal point for US collection against Soviet ICBM's, ABM system or space programs. ]

There are two aspects to this problem; first, the management control over collection system operations, and second, the means by which these systems are tasked and instructed about target priorities. With regard to the first, it is true that there is no single manager of all the systems that cover these Soviet targets. Most of the systems, however, are grouped under one of several managers whose intelligence

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responsibilities are clear. Collectively, NRO, NSA, DIA and CIA manage most of the important collectors and each recognizes the DCI as the authority on tasking and collection priorities. We are satisfied that these collectors are responsive to national tasking whenever the tasking procedures are clear and assertive. If these systems have been targeted improperly from time to time, we would look first to our tasking mechanism and our targeting rationale to seek improvement. At the same time, it is important to recognize that there are important collection systems which are not managed by elements of the intelligence community. In some cases, [REDACTED] this is because the primary mission of the system is not intelligence collection. It is therefore appropriate that these systems should look to the JCS and the military departments for tasking guidance. On the other hand, there are systems whose primary activity is the collection of unique national intelligence but whose management is outside the traditional purview of the DCI and the USIB. Such systems include the ARIS ships, managed by the Eastern Test Range, and the Shemya radar, managed by NORAD. While these systems have been generally responsive to established intelligence priorities, there is no formal DCI mechanism at present which drives the details of their operations or monitors or influences their development and use.

We recommend that funds for the ARIS ships (and related data processing), the Shemya radar and other collectors with a

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primary mission for national intelligence collection\* be carried in the National Intelligence Budget and that their direct management responsibility be moved to an element of the intelligence community. Until such changes can be effected, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense be asked to promulgate specific instructions concerning the responsiveness of these entities to USIB guidance. (As you know, the need to do this was addressed on page 46 of your memorandum of October 1972 to the President.)

With regard to the problem of tasking the collectors, our procedures are not comprehensive or uniform and, in the case of some systems, are inadequate. [We have two USIB committees with primary responsibilities to provide tasking guidance: COMIREX and the SIGINT Committees. In its narrow area of overhead imagery, COMIREX works very closely with NRO, the collection manager, and NPIC, the data processor, in generating an overall ~~collection strategy~~ and day-to-day tasking guidance. On the other hand, the SIGINT Committee has not yet developed this close relationship with the SIGINT collectors and processing operations, nor does it have a detailed strategy as a basis for day-to-day tasking or longer range program planning. Some steps have already been taken to improve matters in the SIGINT Committee's world which, as you know, is vastly more complex than that of COMIREX. In particular, the SIGINT Committee has recently set up a working group charged to develop a mechanism by which the Committee can routinely determine and report on the degree to which SIGINT requirements are being satisfied.]

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We recommend that a formal notification of this action be promulgated by you throughout the community and that the collection system managers be charged to give their support.

\*The list of collectors that fall in this category should be defined by the USIB [redacted] It would, however, be impractical to attempt to define the list more precisely until you had an agreement in principle with the Secretary of Defense.

If this effort is successful other steps would follow which in the long term would result in a better integration of the whole requirements -- tasking -- collection -- processing cycle and also set the pattern for the structuring and involvement of other USIB committees in supporting DCI program planning and analysis efforts. To achieve this goal it may be necessary to provide the SIGINT Committee with staff support comparable to that available to COMIREX.

We recommend that you ask the SIGINT Committee Chairman to advise you of his prospective personnel needs so that these requirements can be included in the overall review of personnel allocations.

~~As we alluded to above,~~ there are some important collectors which are not currently within the purview of either COMIREX or the SIGINT Committee. This can be corrected by putting them under one of these two committees, by creating a new committee, or by making GMAIC specifically responsible for their monitoring and tasking.

We recommend that the IC Staff Director consult with the three chairmen and give you recommendations on how this change can best be implemented.

Program Planning and Assessment

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2. The report recommends that we develop a collection strategy which relates prioritized information needs to optimal use of collection resources.

We take some issue with the report's conclusion that no collection strategy currently exists for the employment of our collectors. The requirements and general tasking guidance that has been promulgated by

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the USIB committees and the mechanisms for operating the collectors against those guidelines have, we believe, represented the formulation and implementation of an overall collection strategy. On the whole it has resulted in the operation of resources against those targets that the USIB has considered important. It is true, however, that a focused, rigorous analysis to derive such a strategy has not been performed, and we are persuaded by the OMB report that our tasking procedures would be more effective if such an analysis were conducted and documented. We think a good way to start toward this goal would be to select a couple of very important intelligence problems, and define a strategy for them which would relate specific intelligence needs to collection system tasking and to resources assigned. In particular, we propose constructing such a strategy for two high priority subject areas:

1. Monitoring of the Arms Limitation Treaty;
2. Coverage of Soviet technological developments which pose a pre-emptive threat to US ICBMs.

The first of these is already underway. Subsequent to the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and the Interim Agreement, the USIB SALT Monitoring Working Group set in motion just such a study with an objective of insuring adequate information to permit confident monitoring of Soviet activities in this regard. It is planned to carry this work

through to the point where it gives explicit guidance for collectors operating against this requirement.

We recommend you instruct the director of the IC Staff to give his sponsorship to the on-going work on the Arms Limitation Treaty and initiate a similar study on Soviet developments which pose a threat to US ICBMs. FMSAC would be an appropriate office to lead a community study group in the latter area.

3. The report recommends development of a cross program budget for collection activities against Soviet ICBM/SLBM, ABM system and space programs.

For several years the IC Staff has been fulfilling the OMB initiative to develop a consolidated intelligence resource information system (CIRIS).

The intent is to display the distribution of resources by intelligence function and target orientation to help give visibility to how resources track with priorities and, by extension, to provide data for cost/benefit evaluation. Although there is considerable bureaucratic resistance from elements of the community to reporting such information to a central authority, CIRIS is now operational, to the degree that the computer software exists to handle the array of data, and routine reporting procedures have been initiated with ☐ organizational and collection entities of the community. However, CIRIS is still far from being a management information system with the accuracy and relevance needed to serve the community program managers. Its data base is still not sufficiently refined and reporting by community elements is superficial. Thus, CIRIS is not in a state where it can do what we must eventually



expect of it -- to provide the kind of cross-program resource displays which the OMB report and our own reviews this past year suggest are needed. To take a step towards this goal, attention should be given to either improving CIRIS or substituting for it a more suitable management information system.

We recommend that you instruct the DCI/IC to develop a management information system concept which would correct the current deficiencies of CIRIS. The concept should cover the types of data required, reporting formats, schedules, and procedures for reviewing the data on a cross-program basis. Since the development of such a concept will need full support from DoD elements, we recommend you seek the personal support of the Secretary of Defense prior to launching the DCI/IC effort.

4. The report recommends development of a management information system for monitoring the flow of data collected against particular target subjects such as the SS-9, Galosh, ASAT, etc.

The monitoring of this data flow should be a part of the management information system that we recommend be developed in Section 3. However, it is likely that even before the overall system concept can be designed, the structure of this portion of the system will become apparent as the "collection strategies" recommended in Section 2 are developed. It is possible then that the portion of the overall information system which will deal with Soviet strategic weapons can be formalized well before the total system concept has been completed.

We recommend that, as the "collection strategies" of Section 2 evolve, the IC Staff design a cross-program budget and a data flow display for technical collection against Soviet strategic weapons. The organization of this data display should be handled by the CIRIS staff with the objective of eventually incorporating the results into CIRIS or its derivative.

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Analysis and Production

5. The report recommends that the NIPM include a display of the level and distribution among target subjects of "pure" analytic effort against strategic threat subjects, such as SS-9, Galosh, SA-5, etc.

✶ We are persuaded that such information would be useful to the production office managers as well as to the DCI and the NIPM recipients and that steps should be taken to provide the suggested display on a routine basis. Again, this is the kind of display which we hope eventually can be routinely extracted from CIRIS. However, although most of the data categories needed are already incorporated in CIRIS, there is great doubt that the current CIRIS reporting channels would produce accurate information of the kind suggested by the report. There is some hope that the Chairman of GMAIC might get better information about actual distribution of analysts within the various production offices through his committee membership and we suggest using that channel to get the process started. However, if he is to be successful in this, the GMAIC Chairman will need strong support from the DCI to get cooperation from community elements which in the past have not been responsive to these initiatives:

✶ We recommend that the GMAIC Chairman be directed to determine on a quarterly basis the distribution of analytic effort among target subjects along the line of those suggested by the OMB report. The CIRIS staff should provide data storage and analytic support to the GMAIC Chairman and have in mind the possibility of eventually incorporating the result of this work into the CIRIS data base and reporting system.

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6. The report recommends increasing the number of analysts devoted to Soviet ICBM/SLBM and ABM systems.

We agree that the production offices and the processing elements of the community should be alert for areas or special intelligence problems where additional contractual work or additional staff would be useful. To make this happen, the Office of the DCI must encourage such initiatives by establishing appropriately lenient criteria for the approval of staff or fund increases when they are proposed. We are, however, reluctant to recommend specific increases at this time in the number of staff analysts devoted to Soviet missile systems. The inherent limitations of even our most sophisticated collectors to produce a continuing flow of new data creates a situation where substantial increases of analysts devoted to a particular subject area could bring us to a point where they cannot be fully and productively occupied. Exactly where this point is can only be a matter of judgment but we think we are close to it in subject areas like the SS-9 and ABM. On the other hand, it may be necessary to increase the number of the total analytic force, in order to more adequately cover problem areas which are rising to national prominence but for which we are not yet adequately staffed.

Other ways to improve the product are to improve the quality of the analysts and provide them with those tools which can make their work easier and more productive. The production offices need to attract mature analysts and keep them free from administrative, management and other non-analytic activities. To do this, more flexibility is needed to

establish non-supervisory positions at the supergrade and near-supergrade levels.

We recommend that the Director of the IC Staff work with all the producers of national intelligence and the Civil Service Commission, and make recommendations to you about what can be done in this regard.

We also need to provide analysts with the sophisticated equipment and techniques that can now be made available to display and manipulate data in ways that can both save them time and enhance their understanding of the data content.

We recommend that the R&D elements of the community be asked to study and recommend equipment and techniques that might enhance the analytic process.

7. The report recommends readjusting the threat subject jurisdiction among the services.

We believe there are advantages to preserving the general character of current arrangements. We think it is essential that sufficient duplication in the missions of our various production offices be maintained to insure a basis for intellectual competition and debate and to provide checks and balances against bureaucratic or intellectual biases in intelligence reporting. For this reason, we see benefit in having some mission overlap among the military departments. In particular, it has been your policy to encourage both the CIA and the military departments to cover those areas which are of high national importance.

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Processing and Data Distribution

119. The report cites a number of examples where data distribution from important collectors on high priority subjects is slow and not responsive to users needs.

We agree that these problems exist and that it is important that they be corrected. However, to expose what the specific problems are and what procedural and technical improvements are worth considering, it will be necessary to document the technical characteristics of the entire data handling cycle, starting at each collector and ending at the intelligence analyst. This documentation must describe the method of recording the raw data, the processing done by the collector, the mode of communicating the data to the user or to a central processor, the

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functions performed by the central processor, the format of its output and finally, the techniques employed by the production offices in using this data. For each step, technical alternatives need to be laid out for examination. This task would be technical rather than judgmental in nature, seeking to expose the technical and procedural nature of the problem and the alternatives for improvement. For this reason, we believe it is one that can best be done by one or several contractors under the supervision of the IC Staff Director.

We recommend that the Director of the IC Staff initiate action to explore the capabilities of several management consultant contractors to perform such a study and make recommendations to you for implementing necessary contracts.

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
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

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Donald H. Steininger  
Chairman